

# Prof. Dr. David Stadelmann

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https://www.entwicklung.unibayreuth.de/en/team/david-stadelmann/

Master Seminar

### Seminar on Political Economy

Elections, Legislative Behavior and Policy Outcomes

#### Content

In this seminar we analyse determining factors of voter participation, differences in electoral rules, legislative process and political institutions. We want to concentrate on how these differences shape incentives of the main political actors and which policy outcome they foster. Thereby, we scientifically discuss topics frequently debated in the media and politics such as low turnout, the allocation of resources or legislative shirking.

Do less people cast a ballot when the number of seasonal infections is high in their municipality? Do overrepresented constituencies or states get a larger share in the allocation of common resources? How do legislators elected by proportional rule differ to their counterparts elected by majoritarian rule? Does political competition raise the quality of elected legislators and their attempts to extract personal rents? Is there really a positive effect of the number of legislators on government size? And what role do personal characteristics play in politics?

While analysing elections, legislative behavior and policy outcomes, we get to know several strategies to identify causal relationships in political economy.

### **Target Group**

This seminar requires a very good understanding of how to read and interpret econometric results and economic models as well as an understanding of general economic principles. Students should be familiar with econometric methods like OLS, Instrumental Variables, Difference-in-Differences or RDD. Master students in Economics, Internationale Wirtschaft & Governance, Development Studies as well as Philosophy & Economics form the target group for this course. Advanced bachelor students

may apply for the seminar if they have a thorough background in theoretical and empirical analyses but master students receive priority in the case of overbookings. The seminar language is English.

## Accreditation

Students can earn credit points for the following degree programmes:

- Economics (M.Sc.): "Theorie und Empirie der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung" or "Individueller Schwerpunkt"
- Internationale Wirtschaft und Governance (M.A.): "Theorie und Empirie der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung" or "Individueller Schwerpunkt"
- Philosophy & Economics (M.A.): "Electives"
- Development Studies (M.A.): substitute for A6 after individual consultation. Please contact the lecturer before registering.

### Requirements

Seminar participants are asked to give an academic presentation (30 minutes) on topics based on an article which is published in an academic journal. Participants are expected to inform themselves on additional related literature. Participants prepare a discussion (10 minutes) of a research article presented by another participant. Active participation in discussions during the seminar is expected of all participants and attendance is compulsory. The grade will be given on basis of the seminar presentation, prepared discussion and a written seminar paper of approximately 4200 words at Master level (3200 words for advanced Bachelor level).

## Seminar Organisation

Lecturer: Marco Frank (Ph.D. student), Volkswirtschaftslehre E, Marco1.Frank@uni-bayreuth.de

A mandatory **introductory lecture** on the topics of the seminar and the assignment of presentation topics will take place on 5<sup>th</sup> of Nobember 2020 from 17:00-20:00 (room tba). This session serves to present the structure and goals of the seminar, to introduce the topics and requirements for presentations and seminar papers and to allocate the articles. All potential questions regarding the seminar (e.g. difficulty of topics, presentation style, accreditation etc.) will be answered during the introductory lecture. In addition, the lecturer will provide an exemplary presentation of own research related to the seminar.

The **presentations** will take place on the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of January 2021 (time and room tba). Presentations must be handed in electronically in PDF-versions on 21<sup>st</sup> of January 2021 ("NameFirstname\_pres.pdf").

The deadline for the submission of the final **seminar paper** is the 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2021.

**To apply** for the seminar (first-come-first-served basis), please fill out the following form including your three prioritised research articles until the 31<sup>st</sup> of October:

# https://forms.gle/LojDk9q8C1YkrQoC9

For **remaining questions** regarding content or organization of the seminar please send an email to the above.

If current regulations at the time of the scheduled meetings do not allow to meet at University of Bayreuth, we will have the meetings, i.e. introductory lecture and presentations, online.

# **Outline of Topics and Literature**

The following list provides an overview of topics discussed in the seminar. Students are required to choose one article and to search additional literature for their presentations and seminar papers.

# 1. Elections and turnout

- Garmann, S. (2016). Concurrent elections and turnout: Causal estimates from a German quasiexperiment. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 126, 167-178.
- Godefroy, R., & Henry, E. (2016). Voter turnout and fiscal policy. *European Economic Review*, 89, 389-406.
- Lind, J. T. (2020). Rainy day politics. An instrumental variables approach to the effect of parties on political outcomes. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 61.
- Morton, R. B., Muller, D., Page, L., & Torgler, B. (2015). Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment. *European Economic Review*, 77, 65-81.
- Potrafke, N., & Roesel, F. (2018). A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior. *Public Choice*, 178(1-2), 231-265.

# 2. Representation and the law of 1/n

 Egger, P., & Koethenbuerger, M. (2010). Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2(4), 200-212.

- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2016). Distributional consequences of political representation. *European Economic Review*, 82, 187-211.
- -eggers Freier AJPS
- Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2012). Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(3-4), 269-278.

# 3. Electoral rules: proportional vs. majoritarian rule

- Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., & Naticchioni, P. (2011). Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: A micro test. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(3), 144-174.
- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2018). Election rules, legislators' incentives, and policy outcomes: Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 54, 227-239.
- Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., Eichenberger, R. (2016). Preference Representation and the Influence of Political Parties in Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems: An Empirical Test. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1), 181-204.

## 4. Political competition

- Becker, J., Peichl, A., & Rincke, J. (2009). Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition. *Public Choice*, 140(3), 379.
- Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P. D., & Snyder, J. (2009). Political Dynasties. Review of Economic Studies, 76(1), 115-142.
- De Paola, M., & Scoppa, V. (2011). Political competition and politician quality: evidence from Italian municipalities. *Public Choice*, 148(3), 547-559.
- Gavoille, N., & Verschelde, M. (2017). Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958–2012. *European Economic Review*, 92, 180-195.

# 5. Legislative shirking

- Besley, T., & Larcinese, V. (2010). Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament. *Public Choice*, 146(3-4), 291-317.
- Mocan, N., & Altindag, D. T. (2013). Salaries and Work Effort: An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians. *The Economic Journal*, 123(573), 1130-1167.

### 6. Personal characteristics

- Berggren, N., Jordahl, H., Poutvaara, P. (2010). The looks of a winner: Beauty and electoral success. *Journal of Public Economics, 94(1-2)*, 8-15.
- Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016). What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close race in Brazil. *Journal of Development Economics*, 122, 28-45.
- Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017). Who Becomes A Politician? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4), 1877-1914.
- Kozlov, V., Libman, A., & Schultz, A. (2018). Testosterone and Repression in Non-Democracies: Evidence from a Sample of Russian Governors. *Kyklos, 71(2),* 244-278.
- Mavisakalyan, A., & Tarverdi, Y. (2019). Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 56, 151-164.
- Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., & Eichenberger, R. (2015). Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 116, 142-156.