



## Master Seminar on Economic Progress Legislative Behavior and Policy Outcomes

### CONTENT

In this seminar we will analyze differences in electoral rules, legislative process and political institutions. We want to concentrate on how these differences shape incentives of the main political actors and which policy outcome they foster.

Do overrepresented constituencies or states get a larger share in the allocation of common resources? How do legislators elected by proportional rule differ to their counterparts elected by majoritarian rule? Is there really a positive effect of the number of legislators on government size? And what role do personal characteristics play in politics?

While analyzing legislative behavior and policy outcomes, we get to know several strategies to identify causal relationships in political economy. Furthermore, two topics allow students to present their own empirical contributions.

### TARGET GROUP

This seminar requires a very good understanding of how to read and interpret econometric results and economic models as well as an understanding of general economic principles, mathematics and economic models.

Master students in Economics, Internationale Wirtschaft & Governance, Development Studies as well as Philosophy & Economics form the target group for this course. Advanced bachelor students may apply for the seminar if they have a thorough background in theoretical and empirical analyses but master students receive priority in the case of overbookings. The seminar language will be English. Needless to say, participants are not required to be near-perfect in English to participate.

Students can acquire credit points for the following programs:

- Economics (Master): “Individueller Schwerpunkt/Spezialisierung”
- IWG (Master): “Theorie und Empirie der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung“ or “Individueller Schwerpunkt/Spezialisierung“
- Development Studies: „Development Seminar“
- P&E (MA): “Electives”
- All bachelor students as a seminar on „Development“

### SEMINAR ORGANISATION

- Applications for the seminar (first-come-first-served) are possible until **October 15, 2019** via the Google form on

<https://forms.gle/CiTfAcFJPtL5KGRZ8>

- A mandatory **introductory lecture** on the topics of the seminar and the assignment of presentation topics takes place on **October 17, 2019 from 17:15-20:00 in room S 66**. All potential questions regarding the seminar (difficulty of topics, presentation style, etc.) will be answered during the introductory lecture.
- The presentations will take place on **December 13 and December 14 from 08:00-18:00, 2019 in room S 65**. Presentations must be handed in electronically in PDF-versions on **December 12, 2019** (“NameFirstname\_pres.pdf”). Thus, there will be sufficient and equal time for everybody to prepare.
- Deadline for handing in written work: **January 12, 2020**.

### REQUIREMENTS

- Seminar participants are asked to give detailed and professional presentations (30 – 35 minutes) on topics based on an article which is published in an academic journal. Participants are expected to inform themselves on additional related literature.
- Participants have to moderate the discussion following their own presentation and respond to questions from the audience.

- Participants have to prepare a short discussion (5 – 7 minutes) of an article presented by another participant

- Active participation in discussions during the seminar is expected of all participants.

**Attendance is compulsory.**

- The grade will be given on basis of the seminar presentation and a written paper of approximately 4200 words at Master level (3200 words for advanced Bachelor level).

### OUTLINE OF TOPIC AND LITERATURE

The following list provides an overview of topics discussed in the seminar. Students are required to choose one article and to search additional literature when preparing their presentations.

1) Representation

- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2016). Distributional consequences of political representation. *European Economic Review*, 82, 187-211.
- Fink, A., & Stratmann, T. (2011). Institutionalized bailouts and fiscal policy: Consequences of soft budget constraints. *Kyklos*, 64(3), 366-395.
- Rodden, J. (2002). Strength in numbers? Representation and Redistribution in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 3(2), 151-175.

2) Electoral rules: Proportional vs Majoritarian Rule

- Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., & Naticchioni, P. (2011). Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: A micro test. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(3), 144-174.
- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2018). Election rules, legislators' incentives, and policy outcomes: Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 54, 227-239.
- Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., Eichenberger, R. (2016). Preference Representation and the Influence of Political Parties in Majoritarian vs. Proportional Systems: An Empirical Test. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(1), 181-204.

3) District Magnitude

- Portmann, M., Stadelmann, D., & Eichenberger, R. (2011). District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes. *Public Choice*, 151(3-4), 585-610.

- Carey, J. M., & Hix, S. (2011). The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2), 383-397.
- 4) The Law of 1/n
- Egger, P., & Koethenbueger, M. (2010). Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2(4), 200-212.
  - Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2012). Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(3-4), 269-278.
- 5) Female politicians
- Mavisakalyan, A., & Tarverdi, Y. (2019). Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 56, 151-164.
  - Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016). What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close race in Brazil. *Journal of Development Economics*, 122, 28-45.
- 6) Personal Characteristics
- Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., & Eichenberger, R. (2015). Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 116, 142-156.
  - Kozlov, V., Libman, A., & Schultz, A. (2018). Testosterone and Repression in Non-Democracies: Evidence from a Sample of Russian Governors. *Kyklos*, 71(2), 244-278.
  - Berggren, N., Jordahl, H., Poutvaara, P. (2010). The looks of a winner: Beauty and electoral success. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(1-2), 8-15.
- 7) Topic requiring **own empirical contribution**: “The effect of geographical distance on voting behavior when voting on the seat of government”
- Data on the behavior in the roll-call vote on the German seat of government is publicly available. Data on the distance of the respective constituencies and Bonn or Berlin has to be collected.

- Analyze correlation of geographic distance and the voting behavior. In a second step, absence rates in roll-call when having moved to Berlin and potential interactions with previous voting behavior could be analyzed.
  - Note: If you choose this topic you need to contact Marco Frank ahead of the introductory lecture to briefly discuss the work which needs to be done.
- 8) Topic requiring **own empirical contribution**: “Testosterone and legislative behavior in the German Bundestag”
- Data on the behavior and absence rates in roll-call votes are publicly available. Data on the facial width to height ratio (fWHR) or other proxies of testosterone have to be collected.
  - Analyze correlation of fWHR and legislative behavior. In a second step, other dependent variables such as interpellations and interjections during parliamentary sessions could be analyzed.
  - Contribution can be inspired by: Kozlov, V., Libman, A., & Schultz, A. (2018). Testosterone and Repression in Non-Democracies: Evidence from a Sample of Russian Governors. *Kyklos*, 71(2), 244-278.
  - Note: If you choose this topic you need to contact Marco Frank ahead of the introductory lecture to briefly discuss the work which needs to be done.