



Master Seminar on Economic Progress Legislative Behavior and Policy Outcomes

Update: 06.04.2020

CONTENT

In this seminar we will analyze differences in electoral rules, legislative process and political institutions. We want to concentrate on how these differences shape incentives of the main political actors and which policy outcome they foster.

Do overrepresented constituencies or states get a larger share in the allocation of common resources? How do legislators elected by proportional rule differ to their counterparts elected by majoritarian rule? Does political competition raise the quality of elected legislators and their attempts to extract personal rents? Is there really a positive effect of the number of legislators on government size? And what role do personal characteristics play in politics?

While analyzing legislative behavior and policy outcomes, we get to know several strategies to identify causal relationships in political economy.

TARGET GROUP

This seminar requires a very good understanding of how to read and interpret econometric results and economic models as well as an understanding of general economic principles, mathematics and economic models.

Master students in Economics, Internationale Wirtschaft & Governance, Development Studies as well as Philosophy & Economics form the target group for this course. Advanced bachelor students may apply for the seminar if they have a thorough background in theoretical and empirical analyses but master students receive priority in the case of overbookings. The seminar language will be English. Needless to say, participants are not required to be near-perfect in English to participate.

Students can acquire credit points for the following programs:

- Economics (Master): “Individueller Schwerpunkt/Spezialisierung”
- IWG (Master): “Theorie und Empirie der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung“ or “Individueller Schwerpunkt/Spezialisierung“
- Development Studies: „D4 Seminar“
- P&E (MA): “Electives”
- All bachelor students as a seminar on „Development”

SEMINAR ORGANISATION

• Applications for the seminar (first-come-first-served) are possible until **April 22, 2020** via the Google form on:

<https://forms.gle/m4G3F1TaavsiTwM56>

- A mandatory **introductory lecture** on the topics of the seminar and the assignment of presentation topics takes place on **April 23, 2020 from 18:00-20:00 (online)**. All potential questions regarding the seminar (difficulty of topics, types of examination, etc.) will be answered during the introductory lecture.
- Due to the regulations in the next semester, we may replace the presentations by some other type of examination. We will talk about that in our introductory lecture. ~~{The presentations will take place on **June 19 and June 20, 2020 in room tba**. Presentations must be handed in electronically in PDF-versions on **June 18, 2020** (“NameFirstname_pres.pdf”). Thus, there will be sufficient and equal time for everybody to prepare.}~~
- Deadline for handing in written work: **August 31, 2020**.
- For questions regarding content or organization of the seminar please send an email to Marco1.Frank@uni-bayreuth.de.

REQUIREMENTS

- Due to the regulations in the next semester, we may replace the presentations by some other type of examination like a take home exam or scientific feedback on the seminar papers of other participants. We will talk about that in our introductory lecture.
- ~~Seminar participants are asked to give detailed and professional presentations (30 minutes) presenting the content of an article which is published in an academic journal. Participants are expected to inform themselves on additional related literature.~~
- ~~Participants have to moderate the discussion following their own presentation and respond to questions from the audience.~~

• ~~Participants are required to participate in discussions after other presentations. In order to incentivize the preparation for the seminar, a short test will be written on June 19 with simple questions on the content of the papers covered in the seminar. Students receive a bonus for achieving more than 50% of 0.3/0.4 on their grade for their presentation. Students receive a malus for less than 20%.~~

• **Attendance is compulsory.**

• The grade will be given on basis of the seminar presentation and a written paper of approximately 4200 words at Master level (3200 words for advanced Bachelor level).

OUTLINE OF TOPIC AND LITERATURE

The following list provides an overview of topics discussed in the seminar. Students are required to choose one article and to search additional literature when preparing their presentations.

1) Representation

- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2016). Distributional consequences of political representation. *European Economic Review*, 82, 187-211.
- Rodden, J. (2002). Strength in numbers? Representation and Redistribution in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 3(2), 151-175.

2) Electoral rules: proportional vs majoritarian rule

- Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., & Naticchioni, P. (2011). Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: A micro test. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(3), 144-174.
- Maaser, N., & Stratmann, T. (2018). Election rules, legislators' incentives, and policy outcomes: Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 54, 227-239.

3) The law of 1/n

- Egger, P., & Koethenbueger, M. (2010). Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2(4), 200-212.
- Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2012). Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(3-4), 269-278.

4) Political competition

- Becker, J., Peichl, A., & Rincke, J. (2009). Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition. *Public Choice*, 140(3), 379.
- Gavaille, N., & Vershelde, M. (2017). Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958–2012. *European Economic Review*, 92, 180-195.
- Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P. D., & Snyder, J. (2009). Political Dynasties. *Review of Economic Studies*, 76(1), 115-142.
- De Paola, M., & Scoppa, V. (2011). Political competition and politician quality: evidence from Italian municipalities. *Public Choice*, 148(3), 547-559.

5) Legislative shirking

- Mocan, N., & Altindag, D. T. (2013). Salaries and Work Effort: An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians. *The Economic Journal*, 123(573), 1130-1167.
- Besley, T., & Larcinese, V. (2010). Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament. *Public Choice*, 146(3-4), 291-317.

6) Female politicians

- Mavisakalyan, A., & Tarverdi, Y. (2019). Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 56, 151-164.
- Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016). What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close race in Brazil. *Journal of Development Economics*, 122, 28-45.

7) Personal Characteristics

- Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., & Eichenberger, R. (2015). Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 116, 142-156.
- Kozlov, V., Libman, A., & Schultz, A. (2018). Testosterone and Repression in Non-Democracies: Evidence from a Sample of Russian Governors. *Kyklos*, 71(2), 244-278.
- Berggren, N., Jordahl, H., Poutvaara, P. (2010). The looks of a winner: Beauty and electoral success. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(1-2), 8-15.
- Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017). Who Becomes A Politician? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4), 1877-1914.